




FACT AND FICTION: 
THE PROBLEM OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING 







Questo saggio presenta una lettura del Diario di un sognatore di Luigi 
Malerba sulla base della teoria dell’autobiografia elaborata da Philippe 
Lejeune in Le pacte autobiographique. Cerca di illustrare come il libro di 
Malerba gioca ironicamente con i problemi inerenti alle riflessioni 
sistematiche di Lejeune già rilevati da critici come Michel Beaujour o Paul de 
Man, cioè l’insolubile contraddizione tra la postulata autenticità dei fatti narrati 
ed il modello romanzesco-letterario cui ubbidisce involontariamente ogni 
racconto della propria vita. La carica umoristica del Diario  deriva addirittura 
dall’impossibile ipotesi che i sogni si possano registrare in modo scientifico 
come dati obbiettivi. Così la storia del sognatore conferma le obbiezioni dei 
critici di Lejeune, mettendo in rilievo la dipendenza dello scrittore da strutture 
culturali che precedono e dominano le sue esperienze “reali”. Il Diario di un 
sognatore può essere letto come la ricerca dell’io in un mondo in cui tutto è 
divenuto citazione, riproduzione o semplicemente metafora. Se l’io minacciato 




This article gives an interpretation of Malerba’s Diario di un sognatore 
based on Philippe Lejeune’s theory of autobiography. According to 
Lejeune’s definition, Malerba’s book is not an autobiography in the 
strict sense of the term, as it covers only one year of the author’s life 
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and a very restricted aspect of it. But as a diary recording the author’s 
personal dreams, it doubtlessly represents a form of autobiographical 
writing. The prologue even seems to confirm the existence of what 
Lejeune would call an explicit “autobiographical pact”. Before 
discussing Malerba’s text I would like to give an account of Lejeune’s 
notion of the pacte autobiographique as well as a brief survey of the 
controversy it provoked among his major critics. 
According to Lejeune, what defines autobiographical writing as 
such is the assurance given by the author that the story which he relates 
is the story of his real life narrated as authentically as possible. As the 
biographer records the facts of a person’s life with the utmost historical 
precision, the author of an autobiography establishes a so-called 
“referential pact” with his reader: a pacte référentiel, asserting that his 
discourse refers to a reality beyond the text: 
As opposed to all forms of fiction, biography and autobiography are 
referential texts: exactly like scientific or historical discourse, they 
claim to provide information about a “reality” exterior to the text, and 
so to submit a test of verification. Their aim is not simple 
verisimilitude, but resemblance to the truth. Not “the effect of the real,” 
but the image of the real. All referential texts thus entail what I will call 
a “referential pact,” implicit or explicit, in which are included a 
definition of the field of the real that is involved and a statement of the 
modes and the degree of resemblance to which the text lays claim 
(Lejeune, 1989: 22).  
Of course, Lejeune himself recognizes that the situation of the 
autobiographical writer is much more complex than that of the 
biographer. In the former case the issue is not resemblance but identity, 
which entails a series of problems. For example, how can you seriously 
expect a subject to give an objective account of his or her personal life? 
As Jean Paul Sartre has argued, every individual is free at any point of 
his existence to develop a new project of his own life and to reinterpret 
his past in the light of it. That is obviously what Lejeune has in mind 




the ultimate expression of truth (if we reason in terms 
of resemblance) can no longer be the being-for-itself 
of the past (if indeed such a thing exists), but 
being-for-itself, manifested in the present of the 
enunciation. It also implies that in his relationship to 
the story (remote or quasi-contemporary) of the 
protagonist, the narrator is mistaken, lies, forgets, or 
distorts – and error, lie, lapse of memory, or distortion 
will, if we distinguish them, take on the value of 
aspects, among others, of an enunciation, which, itself, 
remains authentic (Lejeune, 1989: 25).  
 
Lejeune’s criteria of “accuracy” or “fidelity” (1989: 23) become even 
more problematic against the background of his own statement that an 
autobiography is a particular form of the novel and thus unquestionably 
belongs to the realm of fiction1 .  For what is right or wrong in a 
fictional text is normally judged by aesthetic standards. The question of 
whether individual facts that lie outside the text are “truly” or “falsely” 
represented, is aesthetically irrelevant. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Lejeune’s critics almost unanimously point to this inner 
contradiction as a drawback or a fault in his theory. 
                                                
1 See Lejeune, 1971: 23: “[...] en fait l’autobiographie est un cas particulier du roman, et 
non pas quelque chose d’extérieur à lui [...].”  On page 30 he furthermore defines an 
autobiography as a work of fiction produced under particular circumstances (“Nous 
devrons toujours garder à l’esprit que l’autobiographie n’est qu’une fiction produite 
dans des conditions particulières”). 
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Michel Beaujour (1977: passim), for example, observes that in his 
early theory Lejeune defines an autobiography as a narrative text which 
represents the story of an individual’s life as it is experienced in its 
chronological sequence2.  Later on, in his studies on Sartre and Leiris, 
however, Lejeune tends to dismiss the importance of a chronological 
order in favour of thematic patterns by which the autobiographer 
confers an (aesthetic) structure and a deeper meaning to his own life 
story3.  For Michel Beaujour, these two different types of discourse 
seem to be incompatible. Influenced by Michel Foucault and Philippe 
Sollers, Beaujour believes that rhetorical language is a self-generating 
medium belonging to a cultural heritage which exists and functions 
independently of individual experience. Language thus erases the 
subject who makes use of its tropes and figures4. 
Not unlike Beaujour, but from a different perspective, Paul de Man 
asks the question of whether autobiography depends on reference, in 
other words whether the author’s life story really “produces 
autobiography”, as Lejeune seems to suggest, or whether the author’s 
life itself is influenced by his autobiographical project and the technical 
demands of his literary language (Man, 1979: 920). De Man seems to 
                                                
2 See Lejeune, 1971: 33: “l’autobiographie est avant tout un récit, qui suit dans le temps 
l’histoire d’un individu [...] la structure principale du texte est narrative [...].” 
3 See Lejeune, 1975: 15 f.: “L’Age d’homme ne semble pas au premier abord être 
composé « chronologiquement » sous la forme d’un récit suivi qui irait de la 
naissance au présent. Ou du moins cette chronologie est secondaire par rapport au 
dessein de construction thématique. [...] Construire une autobiographie autour de 
thèmes et d’images, c’est privilégier dans chaque élément du récit la signification, 
c’est vouloir aboutir à un système de signification. [...] Par cette construction, Leiris 
réalise le projet secret de toute autobiographie (trouver l’ordre de la vie) [...].”   
4 Quoting Foucault Beaujour speaks of “une incompatibilité peut-être sans recours 
entre l’apparition du langage en son être et la conscience de soi en son identité” 
(1977: 451). See also p. 457: “[...] le sujet qui entreprend de dire ce qu’il est en ayant 
recours à ces procédés et à ces structures sera d’emblée amené à déborder sa 
mémoire et son horizon individuel, devenant en quelque sorte le microcosme d’une 
culture qu’il réinvestit de sa présence, et qui le voue simultanément au déplacement 
et à l’absence. A la mort.” 
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be irritated by Lejeune’s apparent irresolution about placing the genre 
of autobiography clearly either in the sphere of  documentary or of 
fictional writing.  
 
It appears, then, that the distinction between fiction 
and autobiography is not an either/or polarity but that 
it is undecidable. But is it possible to remain [...] 
within an undecidable situation? [...] A system of 
differentiation based on two elements that, in 
Wordsworth’s phrase, “of these [are] neither, and [are] 
both at once” is not likely to be sound (Man, 1979: 
921).  
 
Paul de Man himself believes that, conditioned as it is by metaphorical 
language, the author’s perception of his own self can only be illusory 
and fictitious. 
Michel Beaujour’s and Paul de Man’s evaluations of Lejeune are 
not shared by John Eakin, a critic who perhaps shows the deepest 
insight into the dynamic structure of Lejeune’s concept of 
autobiography. Also Eakin is fully aware of Lejeune’s being torn 
between fact and fiction (between story and discourse, as he puts it), 
but in his view, Lejeune’s shifting perspectives demonstrate the 
subtlety of his theory: “One could infer a change of heart or a careless 
contradiction, but I think it would be truer to say that the disparity 
between these formulations points to the fundamental complexity of 
Lejeune’s critical personality” (Eakin, 1975: xii). Not willing to 
simplify the complexity of the object of his investigation for the sake of 
a “clean” theoretical system, Lejeune in fact circumscribes it from 
different angles and points of view, always testing his theses 
empirically against a variety of autobiographical texts. At the same 
time he himself points out the contradictions he encounters in his 
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investigation and attempts to resolve them, thus continuously 
modifying his theory5.  
                                                
5 About ten years after Le pacte autobiographique, in Moi aussi, Lejeune himself makes 
fun of the imperfections of his own theory and his continuous revisions in an ironic 
self-portrait which is an amusing pastiche of La Bruyère’s Caractères. See “Le pacte 
autobiographique (bis)”. In: Lejeune, 1986: 13-35: 13. 
In accordance with Eakin’s appreciation of the subtlety of Lejeune’s 
arguments, I would like to show in my analysis of Luigi Malerba’s 
Diario di un sognatore, that the contradictions in Lejeune’s theory may 
indeed be regarded as heuristic because they may help us to recognize 
analogous discrepancies in contemporary autobiographical literature. 
One need only read the first twenty pages of Malerba’s Diary in order 
to understand that the narrator of this book is caught up in a tension 
between two irreconcilable aims: on the one hand the individual’s 
interest in his dreams as plain chronological facts, and on the other 
hand his deeply felt dissatisfaction with the arbitrary character of this 
chronicle and the irresistable desire to arrange the collected material 
within the structure of a literary text. The wit of Malerba’s book 
derives precisely from this ambiguous situation.  
Lejeune’s criterion of authenticity seems to be particularly valid for 
the genre of the diary adopted by Malerba, in which the chronological 
order and the closeness to the facts of everyday day life are 
self-evident. As it lacks the retrospective distance between the act of 
writing and the experience that is related, diary writing is less 
dependent on the selective nature of memory. It rather captures life 
spontaneously as it presents itself in immediate experience. Principally 
meant for private use, it usually makes a much more intimate 
impression than a classical autobiography and makes no claim to a 
particular stylistic quality. However, this genre, too, has produced 
examples of self-analysis at an outstanding literary level.   
It seems that Luigi Malerba’s Diario di un sognatore was meant to 
be a literary text from the very beginning. This is evident from the 
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paratext, a prologue and an epilogue adressed to the reader of the book. 
From a rhetorical point of view, however, the book apparently has been 
devised to present itself as non-literary as possible. In the prologue the 
writer informs us that he made the plan to record his dreams during one 
calendar year: from the 1st of January to the 31st of December 1979. 
This purely arbitrary span of time, which does not correspond to a 
particularly important period in the diarist’s personal life, suggests an 
objective, almost scientific observation: 
 
Questo libro è composto dalle trascrizioni dei miei 
sogni lungo il corso di un anno, il 1979. Una cronaca 
dunque o un diario di eventi che appartengono all’area 
dell’immaginario e che ho riferito con la massima 
precisione e fedeltà che erano consentite, come se si 
trattasse di resoconti destinati a una indagine 
scientifica (Malerba, 1981: 5).  
 
In a note following the prologue the writer adds: 
 
Ho trascritto i sogni giorno per giorno, quasi sempre al 
mattino, velocemente e senza rileggere il testo. [...] Mi 
sono fatto scrupolo di trascrivere tutti i sogni, si 
intende compatibilmente con il ricordo, anche quelli 
che dentro di me «disapprovavo» o che comunque non 
mi piacevano, e ho resistito alla tentazione di operare 
qualsiasi tipo di censura. Solo in rari casi ho aggiunto 
piú tardi qualche particolare che avevo omesso per 
dimenticanza nella prima stesura (1981: 17 f.). 
 
This prologue is an excellent example of an autobiographical pact as it 
has been defined by Lejeune6. The writer of the diary not only feels 
                                                
6 Malerba seems to allude to the theory of the autobiographical pact, when he 
formulates: “È sulla base di tali ovvie premesse che questo lavoro reclama un suo 
credito presso i lettori.” (1981: 6; italics mine.) 
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obliged to situate himself in real space (places of residence, travels) 
and time (every entry is exactly dated), but also reassures his reader of 
the utmost sincerity of his project. He promises that his dreams will be 
recorded impartially, without additions or substractions, and without 
any attempt at their interpretation which he regards as superfluous. For 
dreams are real experiences in themselves (“esperienze reali”) 7 . 
Moreover, the prologue reveals certain rhetorical elements identified by 
Lejeune as typical of the autobiographer’s claim for credibility8.  So, 
for example, the diarist deplores the fragmentary character of memory 
or the difficulty of describing in words the images of his dreams9. 
Ironically enough, the project of a neutral recording of his dreams is 
undermined as soon as the diarist sets out to realize it. In his prologue 
he had maintained that the chosen period for his investigation (ricerca) 
was to be as arbitrary as the investigated object:  
 
La scelta di un percorso temporale, un anno in questo 
caso, è arbitraria. È uno dei limiti di un lavoro che, per 
non sottostare alle convenzioni retoriche e narrative, 
assume una forma «aperta» e cioè conforme alla 
arbitrarietà e casualità del fenomeno che si propone 
di descrivere (1981: 8). 
                                                
7 See Malerba, 1981: 5: “Questo libro alla fine non si propone niente di piú che offrire 
del materiale di prima mano su una attività della mente [...].” See also p. 9: “Non 
tenterò quindi di avventurarmi nella interpretazione dei sogni registrati in questo diario 
[...]. A loro volta i sogni diventano di per se stessi esperienze reali senza per questo 
dover rendere conto alla realtà delle loro strutture e forme.”  
8 See Lejeune’s account of rhetorical commonplaces regarding the “phenomenology of 
memory” or the problem of “the ineffable” in: Lejeune, 1971: 76-79. 
9 See Malerba , 1981: 5: “Uno scarto obiettivo si verifica anzitutto nel passaggio dal 
fenomeno alla sua trascrizione [...]. [...] Credo che rientri nella norma l’eventualitá che 
un certo numero di sogni, o una loro parte, venga dimenticato.”  See also page 12: 
“Quali saranno dunque le parole piú adatte e neutrali per dare espressione ai sogni? 
[...] per fissarne lo svolgimento e i percorsi nella loro fenomenologia spicciola, 




But then the book begins with the report of the annoying fact that a 
most interesting dream has occurred in the night between the 30th and 
the 31st of December 1978, that is exactly 24 hours before the date 
which should have marked the beginning of the dreamer’s diary: 
“«Ecco un sogno che avrei preferito fare domani notte quando 
incomincerò a annotare i sogni.» Lieve disappunto per questo sogno 
intempestivo [...]” (1981: 19). Even more irritating is the fact that on 
the morning of the 1st of January 1978 the protagonist cannot 
remember any dreams at all: “[...] nessuna traccia di sogno nella 
memoria al risveglio. (Il fatto è insolito e delude una attesa. [...] pare 
quasi un «dispetto» al programma di annotare i sogni, un piccolo 
sabotaggio ai miei piani, proprio all’inizio” (1981: 20). On the one 
hand, the meticulous account of all these complications strengthens the 
impression of authenticity and thus seems to confirm the 
autobiographical pact of the prologue. For, of course, the narrator 
might as well have cheated, arranging the dates of his dreams 
according to his plans and without the reader’s knowledge. 
Nevertheless, he is determined to stick faithfully to the “facts”, even if 
they are inconsistent with his project. On the other hand, his irritation 
about these “complications” proves that the narrator is far from being 
objective, that his project is far from being “open” and that the alleged 
“scientific” character of his “work” turns out to be an illusion from the 
very start. Although he denies the narrative features of his text in the 
prologue 10 , being a writer, the diarist cannot help having certain 
expectations about the outline and the contents of his book.  
What Malerba shows here in his humorous way is that even in the 
autobiographical subgenre of the diary where chronology has to prevail 
                                                
10 See Malerba, 1981: 8: “I percorsi seguiti dai sogni nella loro formazione si sviluppano 
secondo diagrammi mentali e non retorici e perciò questo libro nel caso migliore darà 




over a logical thematic construction, the necessity of a meaningful 
pattern seems to impose itself. Of course, the juggling with the 
apparent contradictions between the writer’s intentions and their 
realization is an ironical play, in other words it is a fine piece of fiction. 
But readers will not find that the text thereby loses its authenticity nor 
will they complain about the violation of an autobiographical pact. The 
witty opening of Malerba’s Diary rather shows how difficult it is for an 
autobiographer to tackle the reality of his own self,  especially when 
this reality is made up of the subconscious parts of his personality (his 
dreams). The best way to grasp these elusive facts is to make a good 
story of them. As Eakin has rightly pointed out, a person may also 
express himself through a stylistic figure (Eakin, 1985: 189-191). 
Malerba’s best way to express himself  is his irony. 
The difficulty of disentangling facts from fiction seems to be one of 
the major themes of the book. In his prologue the sognatore fears that 
rhetorical and cultural habits might encroach upon the “prehistoric” 
reality of his dreams and falsify their description: 
 
Nel raccontare gli eventi fantastici che si sprigionano 
dal sogno è difficile tuttavia eludere gli statuti culturali 
con l’ausilio dei quali siamo soliti affrontare ogni 
ordine di realtà. Ma il sogno rifiuta per sua natura 
questi strumenti, adotta macchine e finzioni che 
sfuggono a ogni schema raccomandato di lettura. C’è 
il rischio dunque di cadere, con la trascrizione, in un 
falso [...]. Insomma la descrizione degli eventi 
fantastici del sogno non può sfuggire del tutto alla 
ipoteca dei modelli espressivi del soggetto, nonostante 
e a dispetto delle intenzioni di sottrarvisi. Solo le 
marmotte, dopo i loro lunghi sonni, sono del tutto 
esenti da impacci culturali (1981: 13 f.).  
 
He clearly opposes the arbitrary, chaotic structure of his dreams to the 
orderly narrative structures and thus postulates that his dreams have a 
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reality of their own. They are his “raw material” (“materiale di prima 
mano”) which precedes his note-taking and his eventual literary 
treatment (1981: 5). 
 
[...] quasi mai i sogni hanno un inizio netto, il 
corrispettivo della prima pagina di un libro, e ancora 
piú raramente dispongono di un finale (il rifiuto dei 
modelli narrativi ce lo faceva prevedere). Non sempre 
procedono in una direzione precisa e la loro chiusura è 
quasi sempre accidentale e occasionale al punto che 
mai aggiunge senso, come succede con il finale delle 
normali narrazioni [...]. E la chiusura di solito avviene 
dispettosamente qualche istante prima che un evento 
atteso e imminente possa concludere il sogno in senso 
narrativo e significante (1981: 14). 
 
But once more, the diarist realizes that he is mistaken. The truth is that 
the dreams do not exist independently of his consciousness and his 
intentions to write them down. So the opening sentence of the first 
entry of the dreamer’s diary is a puzzled statement that the mere 
decision to record his dreams seem to alter them: “La decisione di 
annotare i miei sogni giorno per giorno nel corso del 1979 incomincia a 
turbare i miei sogni e a condizionare i miei sogni con ventiquattro ore 
di anticipo” (1981: 19). In fact, his dreams take on a literary character 
once they are  used as material for a book: “I soggetti «letterari» 
compaiono con maggiore frequenza da quando ho incominciato a 
prendere queste note. Prima erano molto piú rari” : (1981: 27). 
Surprisingly, his dreams seem to acquire narrative structures. Thus, his 
first dream presents itself in the guise of an “introduction”: “Alla fine 
emerge la sensazione che questo sogno è una «introduzione» ai sogni 
che mi appresto a registrare nel corso del nuovo anno” (1981: 20). 
Many of them even bear a title. Moreover, they have a style which can 
be defined as dantesque, kafkaesque etc. The diarist was determined 
not to censor his dreams. But in one of his literary dreams he is upset 
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because its style does not correspond to his own aesthetic principles 
and convictions: 
 
Sono cosciente di sognare e mi dico: Ecco un sogno 
inutile, che non riuscirò mai a raccontare e che per di 
piú sembra una brutta imitazione di un racconto di 
Kafka. Che cosa ci può essere di peggio di un sogno 
«kafkaiano»? (Il sogno «kafkaiano» si interrompe per 
dar luogo a un «vero sogno» [...] (1981: 24). 
 
Later on, in a second dream he sees an inscription on a marble block 
which he feels he could use as a title for his previous dream in order to 
improve it: 
All’ingresso del fabbricato c’è ora una targa di marmo 
rosa sulla quale leggo la scritta: IL 
PARALLELEPIPEDO. A questo punto penso di 
inserire la targa nel sogno precedente per dare un 
nome al fabbricato con i corridoi e rimediare cosí quel 
sogno che non mi piace (1981: 25). 
 
Dreaming thus seems to be profoundly linked to his activity as a writer. 
It becomes a task like writing a text: making a first draft, having a 
critical look at it, finding additional material in order to correct and 
complete it. The diarist’s fears to fail as a writer are also a recurrent 
subject matter of his dreams. So, for example, he tries to imagine a 
certain place which is supposed to be the background of his dream. But 
he does not succeed in creating the image (1981:122). In another 
dream the sheets of paper from his desk are blown away by the wind 
through the chimney. In yet another dream, words disappear from the 
pages of a book which remains empty (1981: 108, 119).  
Writing itself plays an important part. Letters very often appear in 
their material aspect. They often have the status of real physical things, 
not signs. For example, the sognatore dreams of “soaked words” which 




Un mucchio di carta stampata completamente fradicia 
gettata alla rinfusa su un pavimento, come salvata da 
una alluvione. Mi preoccupo per le parole «gonfiate 
dall’umidità», dovrò stenderle al sole per farle 
asciugare come dei panni. La stanza è nuda, senza 
mobili, con il pavimento di mattoni leggermente 
avvallato al centro, le finestre alte dalle quali non si 
vede fuori. Non devo perdere tempo altrimenti le 
parole bagnate potrebbero «andare a male» (1981: 33).  
 
In another dream he tries to burn words and discovers that some are 
inflammable, others are indestructible. Other times he finds himself 
hammering on words in order to make them rhyme with each other 
(1981: 111 and 117). He also dreams of the headlines in a newspaper 
or of the title pages of books that are unreadable, of the Russian monks 
Cyrillus and Metodius who write in Cyrillic letters, of the luminous 
advertisement of a MAGIC CIRCUS, or of words that fly out of a 
dictionary disguised as butterflies11.  
Words are not his only medium, though. The title of one of his 
dreams is accompanied by music which reminds him of a Hollywood 
movie (1981: 34). A few days later the dreamer sees himself in the 
Sahara desert running towards a screen which shows scenes from 
Casablanca. His aim is to step into the film: “Deserto del Sahara. [...] 
Sono solo, ma laggiú all’orizzonte, su uno schermo lontano, vedo le 
immagini del film Casablanca. Cammino verso lo schermo. Quando 
sarò arrivato entrerò nel film” (1981: 38 f.). The reader asks himself: 
What is more real? The landscape of the desert or the scenes from 
Casablanca? Ideas of things are mediated by artistic representations of 
them. Casablanca is at least as real as the desert. Experiences are 
filtered through the media: journals, books, pictures or films. Thus, in 
                                                
11 See  Malerba, 1981: 19, 33, 22, 23, 83 and 105. 
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an erotic dream the sensuous mouth of a woman first appears on a 
poster before it becomes real (1981: 64). 
These examples seem to confirm Paul de Man’s critique of Lejeune. 
For de Man maintains that the notion of a given “fact” referred to in an 
autobiographical text is an illusion in a world of metaphors and that the 
subject in an autobiographical text must therefore lose his voice and his 
face. Indeed, Malerba’s Diary often records dreams in which the self, 
moving around in a world made of cardboard like the scenery of a 
stage, appears to himself as one-dimensional like a playing-card: “una 
figura piatta, una carta da gioco” or hollow inside: “forse anch’io sono 
un fantasma, mi viene il sospetto di essere vuoto dentro, come le case” 
(1981: 67 and 71).  
But although Malerba blurs the boundaries between fact and fiction 
and depicts his self as being in danger in a world that consists only of 
mental constructions, as an autobiographer he does not lose his face or 
his voice. In a science fiction dream, sitting in an Ufo, the dreamer asks 
himself the crucial question: “Who am I?”, which every serious 
autobiographer tries to answer: “Chissà da dove vengo, chissà dove 
vado. Me lo domando angosciato. E sopratutto chi sono?” (1981: 104). 
His diary seems to give a clear answer to this question. For apart from 
being a dreamer’s diary it is above all a writer’s diary. For the 
sognatore who converses with Cinderella and Ulysses, with Carducci, 
August Strindberg, D’Annunzio and the statue of Marcus Aurelius, 
literary figures, words and images seem to be facts, and rhetoric 
language instead of threatening to obliterate his self gives him a means 
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